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META: RESEARCH IN HERMENEUTICS, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 




Kant and Husserl on bringing perception to 
judgment  
 
Corijn van Mazijk 




There is today much debate about the contents of perceptual experience 
relative to our capacity to make them figure in judgments. There is 
considerably less interest, however, in how we subsume perceptual contents 
in judgments, that is, what judging about a perception is like for us. For Kant 
and Husserl, this second question is as important as the first. Whereas Kant 
tries to answer it in the schematism section of the first Critique, Husserl 
addresses it at length in Experience and Judgment. This paper draws new 
attention to this ‘forgotten’ transcendental problem by comparing both 
accounts of it. I will first discuss Kantian conceptualism in section two and 
schematization in section three. In section four I then turn to the Husserlian 
notion of type, which is today often juxtaposed to Kant’s schema. After 
rejecting one commonly held view that they are functionally identical, I turn 
to Husserl’s work on active synthesis, where I distinguish three different acts 
of judgment and their respective contents. 
 
Keywords: Husserl, Kant, perception, judgment, knowledge, schematism, 





One central dispute in contemporary debates about 
perceptual content is what is often referred to as the 
conceptualism controversy. In brief, this debate, which to a 
large extent centers around McDowell’s (1986, 1994, 1996, 
2009, 2013) conceptualist theory, concerns the question 
whether perceptual contents, in order to be subsumed in 
judgment, or to be open to rationality, must already be 
determined by conceptual (or broadly rational) capacities.1 Kant 
is a major figure in this debate, not only because of his 
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influential ground distinction between two separate sources of 
experience, but also because of the role he ascribes to the 
understanding in synthesizing the contents of intuition, 
particularly in the Transcendental Deduction. Over the past 
decades, the conceptualism controversy has also been discussed 
in the context of Husserl’s philosophy by a number of authors: 
Cobb-Stevens (1990), De Warren (2006), Dahlstrom (2007), 
Barber (2008), Mooney (2010), Hopp (2011), Van Mazijk (2014a, 
2016), Jansen (2015). 
 It is not, however, the conceptualism controversy that I 
will deal with in this paper. Both Kant and Husserl consider 
the question how we bring perception to judgment as of equal 
importance as questions that concern the conceptual 
determination of perceptual content. For some reason, however, 
the former concern has not received much or any scholarly 
attention in recent discussions. If we take conceptualists to ask 
what perceptual contents are like such that they are ‘fit to 
figure in discursive activity’ (McDowell 2013, 42), the question I 
want to pose here is this: what is it like to form a judgment 
about something perceived, i.e., how do we bring perception to 
judgment? 
In the following two sections, I will first offer a fairly 
general outline of the problem of conceptualism in Kant’s 
philosophy and of his notion of schema. In the fourth section, I 
turn to Husserl’s phenomenological notion of type, which is 
today at least on one fairly influential reading perceived to be 
‘functionally almost identical’ with Kant’s schema (Lohmar 
2003, 93). Here I argue that the type is best regarded as a form 
of passively originating habit, which makes it ill-fitted for 
comparison to Kant’s active schema.  In section five and six, I 
then turn to Husserl’s work on active synthesis for an 
alternative account of how we bring perception to judgment. 
Here I discuss what Husserl calls the ‘extraction’ of the state of 
affairs from perception, which may be compared to what is 
today often called ‘demonstrative reference’. After that, I also 
discuss two higher forms of judgment Husserl distinguishes 
and their respective contents. 
 
 






2. Kantian Conceptualism 
Kant’s account of schemata cannot be properly 
understood without considering the Transcendental Deduction 
first. In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant aims to establish 
the rule of the pure concepts of the understanding regarding 
‘everything that may ever come before our senses’ (Kant 1998, 
261 [B160]). This, he thinks, is necessary to maintain the a 
priori status of the pure concepts of the understanding. Because 
Kant is here concerned directly with the conceptual 
determination of perception, it has been the central point of 
focus for conceptualist (and non-conceptualist) readers of Kant. 
As is well known, Kant believes we have two faculties, 
sensibility and understanding, each of which is productive of its 
own elements, intuitions and concepts respectively, 
independently of one another (Kant 1998, 155 [A19/B33]). 
Furthermore, each faculty contains its own pure forms: space 
and time for sensibility, and a list of pure concepts for the 
understanding. These pure forms and concepts determine the 
contents of knowledgeable experiences of the experienced world, 
but they are themselves merely forms, and thus quite unlike 
anything that can be experienced. 
It has frequently been asked why Kant did not simply 
consider space and time to be pure concepts as well. Kant’s 
reasons for locating space and time in a separate faculty go 
back as far as his pre-critical works on space in relation to 
debates between Leibniz and Clarke (Guyer 2005, Guyer 2010, 
Janiak 2009, Van Mazijk 2014a, Van Mazijk 2014b).2 Against 
Leibniz’s relational account, Kant argued that in order to 
account for our experiences of so-called ‘incongruent 
counterparts’ – two objects that are each other’s mirror image – 
one has to make use of something other than concepts. One’s 
left and right hand, for instance, are (in an idealized case) 
incongruent counterparts. Although they are mathematically 
considered point-to-point identical, they cannot be made to fit 
each other through rotation. They are thus incongruent in a 
sense that cannot be accounted for mathematically or 
conceptually. What is needed, additionally, according to Kant, 
is a spatiotemporal point of orientation that can account for the 
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – VIII (2) / 2016 
 422 
 
fact that we are actually aware of a difference between left and 
right hands. This formal viewpoint cannot itself be conceptual, 
as the two-hands experiment shows – which puts us into the 
direction of a non-conceptual faculty of intuition. 
 Consequently, when in the first Critique Kant speaks of 
a required interplay of concepts and intuitions for a 
knowledgeable experience, it appears he has in mind an 
interaction between two very different products. On the one 
hand, sensibility ‘alone affords us intuitions; but they are 
thought through the understanding, and from it arise concepts’ 
(Kant 1998, 155 [A19/B33]). It is this rigid separation which 
prompts questions regarding the relation between concepts and 
perceptions. For how, if they indeed are so heterogeneous, are 
both united in a knowledgeable experience? 
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction provides a part of the 
solution to this. Kant’s primary goal here is to prove that pure 
concepts have a priori validity. There is a particularly 
important passage here often referred to as the ‘second step of 
the B-Deduction’ (Kant 1998, 261-2 [B160-162]; Henrich 1969). 
At this point in the Critique, Kant wants to show that pure 
concepts do not just apply to perceptions when we form a 
judgment, but that through them alone ‘perception itself 
becomes possible’ (Kant 1998, 261-2 [B161]). Kant seems to 
believe that he must show that everything which enters our 
senses already stands under the laws of pure concepts if the a 
priori rule of those concepts is to be guaranteed. 
Kant proceeds this task not by focusing on the form of 
intuition, which is supplied by the pure forms of sensibility 
itself (space and time), but on ‘the laws of their combination’ 
(Kant 1998, 260 [B159]). For Kant, an intuition is brought 
about through combinations or syntheses of sense data 
impinging upon our faculty of sensibility. The first and most 
basic of these syntheses is called the ‘synthesis of 
apprehension’. Kant, however, asserts that the basic perceptual 
unity thereby brought about cannot be brought forth by 
sensibility itself. Instead, this synthetic unity ‘has its seat in 
the understanding’ (Kant 1998, 262 [B162]). Kant explicitly 
takes the category of unity ‘as condition of the synthesis of 
apprehension’ (Kant 1998, 261-2 [B161]). The very reason 





judgment about objects of perception is possible at all is that all 
synthesis, ‘through which even perception itself becomes 
possible, stands under the categories’ (Kant 1998, 261-2 [B161]). 
 Some Kantian non-conceptualists have tried to claim 
that Kant thinks there would also be a type of ‘blind’ intuition 
that does not demand a synthetic unity provided by the 
understanding. Kant, then, could be taken to say that only a 
knowledgeable experience demands concepts whereas a plain 
and simple perception does not.3 To my mind, this reading is 
not so plausible. Kant thinks it is necessary to show that a 
mere synthesis of apprehension is already conditioned by pure 
concepts (Kant 1998, 261-2 [B161]). Synthesis in the 
understanding and synthesis in perception are brought forth by 
‘one and the same spontaneity’ (Kant 1998, 262 [B162]), which 
is a function of the understanding. 
The conceptualism controversy with regard to Kant’s 
philosophy is due to the apparent incompatibility of Kant’s 
claims that (i) intuition is necessarily non-conceptual (as in the 
argument from incongruent counterparts) and (ii) that intuition 
is necessarily structured by concepts (as in the Transcendental 
Deduction). I have tried to resolve that apparent contradiction 
elsewhere (Van Mazijk 2014a, 2014b).4 What matters for 
present purposes, however, is this: when Kant goes on to 
address the ‘power of judgment’ in the schematism section, he 
takes the perceptual object judged about as already structured 
by the understanding in a way that makes judgment possible in 
the first place. The question to be addresses next – how we can 
‘subsume’ intuitions under concepts in judgment (Kant 1998, 
271-2 [A137/B176-A138/B177])5 – is thus essentially marked by 
Kant’s conceptualist view of perception. 
 
3. Kantian Schematism 
The schema takes central stage in Kant’s discussion of 
how we judge about experience with necessity. The sections in 
which Kant deals with it have often been considered the most 
obscure of the first Critique. It is therefore unsurprising that 
they have also been interpreted in different ways. I will here 
restrict myself to making some general observations regarding 
Kant’s schema that I think should suffice for a comparison to 
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Husserl’s more fine-grained analyses, which I will discuss in 
more detail later. 
First, it is important to note that Kant distinguishes 
between empirical and pure schemata. Kant appears to have 
little to no interest in schemata of the first kind, however, 
which seems due to the following two reasons. First, empirical 
schemata are not considered by Kant to be important for our 
capacity to judge with necessity. The second reason is that Kant 
appears to see no real problem in the relation between 
empirical schemata and perceptions. The challenge, he thinks, 
lie only in the case of applying pure concepts, which do not 
resemble anything (Kant 1998, 271 [A137/B176]) as they are a 
priori and therefore not derived from any experience. Pure 
concepts ‘can never be brought to an image at all’ (Kant 1998, 
273-4 [A142/B181]), for any image of them would be inadequate 
to their a priori character, which precisely prescribes rules a 
priori to images. In section five and six, I will show that the 
principal difficulty for Husserl is reversed: there it lies in 
empirical judgment, while a priori judgment is considered to be 
‘only’ a modification of that. 
Since pure concepts are unlike anything we can perceive 
(Kant 1998, 271 [A137/B176]), it seems there is no way for them 
to match onto sensible intuitions. Kant rapidly concludes from 
this that there must be a ‘third thing’ that can mediate between 
pure understanding and sensibility. This task is assigned to the 
imagination, which is a ‘faculty of synthesis’, which in turn is 
said to belong to the understanding (Kant 1998, 238-9 [A120], 
256-7 [B151-152]). The products of the imagination that are 
supposed to make the abstract a priori concepts of the 
understanding more ‘worldly’ and thereby equipped to fit 
intuitions through acts of judgment, are called pure schemata. 
Although Kant is obscure on the matter, it is clear that 
time is supposed to play a crucial role in schematization. As 
Kant had outlined in the Transcendental Aesthetic, all outer and 
inner sense is conditioned by the pure form of time.6 Given that 
both time and the pure concepts of the understanding are a 
priori, the latter can determine the contents of intuition through 
the former. Kant thus takes the transcendental schemata to be a 
priori ‘time-determinations’ and for that reason also 





determinations of the concrete intuitions which take place 
through them. I will not try to give more flesh to this idea here 
than Kant himself seems willing to (who ultimately appears 
content in noting that this procedure is ‘a hidden art in the 
depths of the human soul’) (Kant 1998, 273-4 [A140/B179-B181]). 
 In spite of the many difficulties involved in interpreting 
Kant’s schema, I want to suggest some general characteristics 
that can guide the upcoming comparison to Husserl. First, 
regarding the location of the schema in Kant’s architectonic 
system, we can note that it takes place between the concept and 
the perception.7 The schema operates as a ‘mediating 
representation’ that is ‘intellectual on the one hand and 
sensible on the other’ (Kant 1998, 272 [A138/B177]). However, I 
think it is fair to say that the schema is closer to the 
intellectual than the sensible side. Both schema and 
intellectual concept are rules with a certain determined 
generality or scope. The schema is virtually identical to the 
concept, apart from the fact that it has been made sensible. 
The schema, then, is not a passive accomplishment; it has 
little or nothing to do with our pre-judgmental experience of the 
world. The schema is not supposed to bring about some kind of 
pre-constituted familiarity or generality to the simple perceptual 
apprehension prior to the act of judgment. As I showed in the 
previous section, Kant does to some extent speak of a kind of pre-
structuring of perceptual experience, which he believes is a 
transcendental condition of possibility for having a world that 
lies open to reason. But in doing so, he does not refer to schemata, 
but to the synthesis of apprehension. The schema instead belongs 
to the active ‘power of judgment’, which is a ‘faculty of subsuming 
under rules, i.e., of determining whether something stands under 
a given rule’ (Kant 1998 267-8 [A132/B171]). For now, these fairly 
general observations will have to suffice. 
 
4. Types in Husserl’s Genetic Phenomenology 
In the following three sections I purport to discuss 
aspects of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. I first focus on the 
role of Husserl’s notion of type, which according to Lohmar’s 
leading interpretation is ‘functionally identical’ to the schema 
(Lohmar 2003, 93). After arguing that this comparison is 
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unsatisfactory, I will turn to other aspects of Husserl’s later 
work in search of better alternatives. 
Genetic phenomenology is a specific form of 
transcendental phenomenology that specializes in a kind of 
‘genealogical’ analysis. The exact methodology of genetic 
phenomenology is complex and a matter of ongoing debate.8 In 
order to get an idea of how Husserl uses the term genealogy, one 
needs to understand the meaning of Husserl’s central divide 
between passive and active synthesis. Although this division is 
by no means considered by Husserl as a rigid one (Husserl 1997, 
108), it forms the mold for all of his genetic analyses. 
The term genealogy, when applied to phenomenological 
investigation, yields an image of a layered or stratified 
consciousness. This stratification is understood by Husserl both 
‘anachronically’ as well as ‘diachronically’. On what I call the 
diachronic reading, genealogy points to the ‘sedimentated’ 
layers of consciousness generated by past apprehensions, which 
secretly play their parts in acts performed in the now. Put 
differently, genealogy in the diachronic sense involves the 
phenomenological investigation of one’s current experience in 
order to uncover how that experience is conditioned by one’s 
experiential past. For that reason, Husserl also speaks of a 
phenomenology of ‘habit’. Stripped of phenomenological jargon, 
habits deal with the role of the past in the present through 
what is basically a learning process. 
It is, however, the anachronic sense that determines the 
overall structure of Husserl’s genetic investigations. On this 
reading, genealogy points again to the layered structure of 
consciousness but now in terms of the degree in which the ‘ego’ 
actively participates in them. Thus considered, conceptual or 
judgmental activity are the upper (‘active’) layers of 
consciousness, build upon structures of receptivity (perception) 
which pair with minimal degrees of ego-awareness (or none at 
all). The term ‘passive synthesis’, then, is primarily used by 
Husserl to point to those synthetic achievements of 
consciousness that either do not involve ego-awareness at all or 
a merely receptive ego.9 Active synthesis, by contrast, roughly 
concerns those syntheses to whose essence it belongs that they 
are brought forth by the ego living in the experience. Actively 





produced sense-formations are not just passively given to the 
ego, as is the case in simple (passive) perception, but 
spontaneously created by it, as in judgment. 
Husserl’s later philosophy thrives on the idea that, 
transcendentally speaking, passive perceptual experience both 
shapes and conditions objectivity as we know it. For that 
reason, perception is now taken to hold the important keys to a 
phenomenological-transcendental clarification of objectivity, i.e. 
to a transcendental logic. For one, if one wants to understand 
the logical category ‘unity’, ‘substrate’ or ‘thing in general’, one 
has to clarify the structure of perception (of ego-passive 
syntheses) where thing, unity and substrate are ‘pre-
constituted’. This produces a picture of genetic phenomenology 
as laying bare a kind of hierarchy of sense-formations – of 
grounding relations leading from passive apprehensions to 
more complex active ones. 
Although the so-called ‘anachronic’ line offers the 
general mold for Husserl’s genetic analyses, the notion of type 
is specifically tied to the ‘diachronic’ approach. In other words, 
the type is a notion that belongs to the phenomenology of habit. 
Husserl realized that the achievements of consciousness 
usually have a lasting impact upon future experiences. In this 
regard, he speaks of the ‘sedimentation’ of earlier experiences 
and their becoming a ‘habit’ for consciousness. Husserl further 
acknowledges, in a quite Kantian fashion, that because of this 
‘the world in which we live […] is always already pregiven to us 
as impregnated by the precipitate of logical operations’ (Husserl 
1997, 42). Conceptual and linguistic capacities deeply affect our 
perceptual engagements with the everyday world. Importantly, 
however, this does not yet imply conceptualism regarding the 
contents of experience. The mere phenomenological observation 
that perception is influenced by conceptual capacities does not 
amount to saying that this very influence is a transcendental 
condition of possibility for forming judgments about the world – 
as seems to be the case for both Kant and, more recently, 
McDowell (1996). 
It is worth looking at the ways in which Husserl takes 
habit to shape perception. The easiest examples of 
habitualization would be of active learning processes, such as 
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taking driving lessons, learning new words or acquiring new 
concepts. According to Husserl, ‘every step of [ego-active] 
predicative judgment has its lasting result.’ (Husserl 1997, 211-
212) However, for Husserl, not just cognitive acts but passive 
experiences too can leave permanent imprints upon 
consciousness and thus become part of one’s ‘second nature’. It 
seems therefore unjust to say that ‘habit for Husserl is 
connected with rational deliberation and intellectual scrutiny’ 
(Moran 2014, 32). Although only predicative activity can create 
lasting stores of knowledge for the subject to consciously return 
to time and again, Husserl asserts that mere receptive 
contemplation ‘already creates knowledge which persists as 
habitual’ (Husserl 1997, 62). 
In Ideas II, Husserl remarks that we never encounter 
objects that are completely new to us; every perception is 
accompanied by a sense of familiarity (Husserl 2000, 278). 
Again following Ideas II, this habituality could be said to be the 
result from a passive associative synthesis, through which one 
ongoing experience gets associated with sedimentated past 
ones. As an example of this, we may consider the sound of a 
roaring engine as one absent-mindedly wanders the streets. We 
notice that this sound is in place in this particular context - i.e. 
is contextualized as familiar - because one has heard similar 
sound in comparable situations before. Through such 
familiarity one also (passively) ‘knows’ whether one might have 
to make way for the car or whether one can simply ‘ignore’ it. 
One also ‘knows’ already what one is likely to discover if one were 
to turn one’s eyes to explicate the sound-object, and whether it is 
worth making such an effort. Long story short: a whole space of 
pre-thinking interpretation, anticipations and possible future 
actions are delineated through the workings of habit. 
This example already prepares for an important 
conceptual distinction Husserl makes, namely between the type 
as a form of passive habituality that provides contextualized 
familiarity, and conceptual generality as we find it in judgments. 
It would be a mistake to conflate these – to straightforwardly 
identify types with conceptual generality – but likewise a 
mistake to take types as pre-figured (or pre-constituted) 
conceptual generality.10 If the latter were the case, types could be 





a kind of ‘pre-concepts’. One could then, for instance, have the 
perceptual sound-type for ‘a car’s engine’, and then also the 
(possibly identical) conceptual content ‘a car’s engine’ built onto 
that. The type might then even boil down to a kind of conceptual 
content in perception – a content that can figure both in 
perception and in judgment without undergoing any changes - 
much in the sense in which McDowell speaks of ‘conceptual 
capacities […] drawn on in receptivity’ (McDowell 1996, 9). 
On my reading, this interpretation would misrepresent 
the way types function in perceptual experience. It would be 
misleading to represent the typified perceptual content as the 
propositional sense ‘a car’s engine’, a content which could then 
without any alteration figure in judgment. Instead, one should 
consider the type as a mechanism of habit aiding the unfolding 
of a complete situation in passive perception. Such a situation 
involves among others networks of affective tendencies battling 
over the ego’s attention and a vague space for interpretation 
and future actions on the ego’s behalf and on behalf of the lived 
body. Types do not serve to provide well-marked rules for 
interpretation, as do concepts (conform Kant’s definition). They 
do not yet allow for propositionally expressible contents. 
Instead, they disclose a space for passive interpretation and 
appropriate (kinesthetic) action. The way I see it, this passively 
constituted ‘space’ is dissimilar to conceptual generality to this 
extent that even the notion of ‘pre-concept’ would be inadequate 
to express the nature of the type. To understand the disclosing 
force of the type we should not conceptualize it in the light of 
judgment, but as a sui generis structure of passive sense-making. 
To perceive with a type is thus, at least on my account, 
not primarily a matter of seeing objects as objects of this or that 
sort. The main merit of the type is neither objective nor pre-
objective: it is rather affective. The best way to flesh out the 
specific contribution affectivity makes to perceptual experience 
would be in terms of familiarity and unfamiliarity. Whereas 
unfamiliarity allows for a stronger call upon the ego to turn-
toward, to move closer, to take a better look etc., a sense of 
familiarity may directly disclose a space for appropriate action, 
thus helping consciousness decide which movements and which 
perceptual explications to make next. Types, as all forms of 
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habit generally, are useful because they make complex pre-
structurings of experience possible at an affective level without 
demanding the ego’s active attention. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this section is that 
while Kant’s schema, as we saw earlier, resembles the concept 
as the ‘sensible concept of an object’ (Kant 1998, 276 
[A146/B186]), and thus basically overlaps with the well-
delineated conceptual rule provided by the understanding, the 
type does not seem to provide well-marked rules at all. Unlike 
Kant, Husserl is not interested in perceptual experience solely 
to the extent in which it can figure in reasoning. Husserl rather 
considers the contents of passive perception in their own right, 
not as ‘pre-concepts’, nor as rule-providing schemata, but as a 
sui generis contribution of habit that allows us to make sense of 
the world in passive experience. 
 
5. Husserl on the ‘Extraction’ of the State of Affairs 
from Perception 
If we compare the results obtained thus far, we are 
bound to conclude that types cannot play the same role 
schemata play for Kant. We have therefore attained good 
reasons to turn away from the type to Husserl’s work on active 
synthesis instead. 
But before doing so, it is useful to emphasize that the 
genetic-phenomenological problem of how active judgment 
about a passively pre-constituted perceptual world is possible is 
not identical to the problem troubling Kant in his schematism 
sections. It is essential to Kant’s account of the schema that 
pure concepts are taken to stand in radical isolation from 
empirical experience. The pure schema is in fact called to life 
solely for the purpose of making the heterogeneous products of 
the pure understanding and intuition compatible. Husserl’s 
idea that all concepts are in fact (genetically speaking) derived 
from experience is thus unavailable to Kant, for whom concrete 
perceptual experience is only of an empirical order and 
therefore not a transcendental concern. For Husserl, by 
contrast, the totality of world-experience is included in the 
transcendental field, which guarantees an infinite domain of 
phenomenological investigation that was not available to Kant. 





Transcendental phenomenology therefore has its own 
problems regarding objective judgment. On Husserl’s view, 
‘objectivities of the understanding’ (the contents of judgments) 
are radically different from what is constituted in the sphere of 
passive experience (Husserl 1997, 251). Unlike perceptual 
contents, the contents of judgment are ideal and ‘omni-
temporal’ (Husserl 1997, 258-261); they are freely 
communicable and repeatable at any time. Husserl’s main 
difficulty is to show how objectivity or ‘omni-temporality’ can be 
achieved from transcendental subjectivity. In his genetic work, 
the solution to this problem consists of showing how judgment 
arises out of pre-predicative experience. 
In order to see how this works, I first want to turn 
attention to what Husserl calls the ‘extraction’ of the state of 
affairs.11 The case of extraction can be considered the simplest 
form of judgment Husserl distinguishes, which occurs when we 
form a judgment directly about something perceived. In 
contemporary debates, this is often called ‘demonstrative 
reference’. For one, I can perceive that there is mug on the 
table, but I can also directly judge that there is a mug on the 
table on the basis of the perception. The matter to consider in 
this section is how Husserl describes the transition from one to 
the other. 
According to Husserl, in seeing a certain situation, for 
instance a white coffee mug, we may obtain a perceptual 
content that is already synthetically structured with a 
substrate and a predicate (substrate: mug, predicate: white). 
This is a crucial aspect of Husserl’s account of perception: what 
we passively apprehend is already pre-predicatively structured. 
It is, however, only so structured; it is not apprehended by the 
subject as being so structured. In spite of the rich achievements 
ascribed by Husserl to passive experience, the latter can never 
by itself bring about objectivities properly (Husserl 1997, 251). 
Perceptual contents are never ideal – repeatable and shareable 
– contents in the way the contents of judgment are. 
Husserl has a quite enigmatic but very illuminating way 
of describing how we extract ideal contents from perceptual 
situations. First of all, like all judgment, the extraction of the 
state of affairs demands a specific ‘will to knowledge’; a new 
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kind of ‘voluntary participation’ that is unknown to passive 
perceptual experience. These are noetic features of the act of 
judgment, i.e. they concern the side of the act-processes and the 
ego living in the experience. According to Husserl, judging is a 
desire to ‘fix […] the result of contemplative perception’, in such 
a way as to obtain it ‘for once and for all’ (Husserl 1997, 198). 
Judgment is always a willful act by an ego living in the 
experience. There can be no judgment without a judger. 
Husserl continues that if the ego intends to know that ‘S 
is p’ on the basis of the perceptual situation ‘S is p’, it must 
actively and willingly turn back toward the synthesis ‘S is p’ as 
passively accomplished (Husserl 1997, 208). The ego, he writes, 
must repeat the passive synthetic process, but this time in a 
changed, willful attitude. Importantly, it is here not just any 
plain object, but rather the passively established connection 
itself (‘S is p’) that becomes a theme for the subject. It is 
because this connection was already a part of the passively 
accomplished perceptual situation that Husserl can refer to the 
new accomplishment as a ‘turning-back’. To extract the state of 
affairs from the perceptual content is thus in a way a reflection 
upon intentionality itself, in other words: it consists in an active 
turning back to a synthetic achievement that was already 
accomplished by a passive consciousness. 
Through this process, the ego has now ‘produced’ a new 
kind of object, namely an ‘objectivity of the understanding’. The 
ego is no longer just looking at the white coffee mug; it now 
intends the objective state of affairs. Husserl leaves us no doubt 
that this conceptual objectivity does not figure at the level of 
passive experience: it ‘can be never originally apprehended in a 
mere act of reception’ (Husserl 1997, 251). However, at the 
same time, the new conceptual objectivity must be said to have 
figured in some way in the passive perception already. After all, 
it is only through an active repetition that the judgment could 
take place – which means that the theme of the act of judgment 
was present prior to the judging. On Husserl’s reading, then, 
the status of the object of judgment turns out almost 
paradoxical: it is present in the pre-judgmental experience, 
while simultaneously lying infinitely beyond it. 





As a final remark, it seems to follow from Husserl’s 
description of extraction as an active repetition of a passively 
accomplished synthesis that the perceptual content cannot 
really have changed through the act of extracting the state of 
affairs; what we now judge about has to be the exact same 
coffee mug that we intended before, for the judgment consists in 
repetition.12 At least regarding judgment through extraction, 
then, Husserl appears supportive of McDowell’s claim that ‘that 
things are thus and so is the content of an experience, and it 
can also be the content of a judgment’ (McDowell 1996, 26). In 
extraction, there need be no distance between mind and world. 
 
6. Husserl on Judgments of Empirical and A Priori 
Universality 
The previous outline only dealt with direct predicative 
judgments about perceptual contents, which Husserl calls the 
extraction of the state of affairs. Such acts do not, however, 
amount to a priori judgments of the sort Kant is interested in 
when he speaks of schemata. Kant is specifically interested in 
finding out how we apply a priori concepts – which are not 
derived from experience – to perceptual experiences. In order to 
see what Husserl has to say about a priori judgment, however, 
it is necessary to first consider what he understands by a priori 
in a bit more detail. 
Husserl defines a priori as ‘preceding all factuality [and] 
all determinations arising from experience’ (Husserl 1997, 353) 
and as ‘prescribing rules’ to actual things rather than as being 
derived from actuality (Husserl 1997, 354). So far this matches 
Kant’s views. Husserl, however, departs from Kant by 
expanding the notion of a priori as to include virtually any 
possible objectivity whatsoever. According to Husserl, there is 
an a priori essence of ‘coffee mug’ or ‘table’ as much as there is 
one of ‘triangle’ or ‘number’. Although this may seem odd, 
Husserl has good motives for this position. As Husserl writes, it 
would be ‘completely absurd’ (Husserl 1997, 353) to restrict the 
possible use of pure imaginative variation in order to attain a 
priori essences to mathematics. Instead, imagination allows for 
any particular object to be modified into a pure possibility, as 
for instance in the a priori essence ‘a table in general’.13 That 
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we can intuit an essence a priori, then, does not need to say 
much about the eternal truth of that insight; it says more about 
the essential relations between imagination and experience, 
between possibility and actuality (Husserl 1997, 353). 
Husserl’s phenomenological problem of a priori 
judgment is not, then, as with Kant, one that concerns the 
application to experience of a limited number of pure concepts 
of the understanding. On Husserl’s view, one can modify any 
objectivity apprehended through judgment into an a priori 
objectivity, thereby transforming an act of empirical judgment 
into an a priori one. Husserl notes that this transition – unlike 
the one from perceptual situations to judgmental states of 
affairs – is only gradual. Here, as I discussed previously, an 
entirely new object – an ‘ideal’, communicable one – is 
constituted by an active repetition of a passive synthesis. When 
passing from empirical to a priori judgment, by contrast, 
Husserl speaks only of a ‘modification’ of the judgment-sense 
(Husserl 1997, 365-373); it here concerns a mere shift of 
attention to the pure universal already implicitly contained in 
the judged state of affairs. 
So what happens in the transition from the extracted 
state of affairs to the a priori judgment? In between these 
essentially different types of judgment-acts Husserl locates 
another type of judgment which we may call the judgment of 
empirical universality. On Husserl’s view, in performing an act 
of demonstrative judgment, we form a judgment that deals 
directly with ‘the self-givenness of individual objects’ (Husserl 
1997, 317-318). We can also, however, judge in such a way that 
the ‘reference to the universal […] is itself thematized’ (Husserl 
1997, 317-318). The idea here is that although in normal 
predication we make use of universal concepts, the relation to 
the universal does not itself become thematic here. More 
concretely, one can simply think ‘this rose is red’ without 
apprehending this rose as one possible instance of the universal 
‘rose in general’. To grasp the universal, Husserl notes that the 
active ego living in the experience must shift interest from the 
concrete intended object to the ‘one’ that can be apprehended 
through it (Husserl 1997, 321-327; Husserl 2002, 221). This 
universal is given just once, and the intended object is now 





understood as only a particularization of it. For instance, ‘this 
rose here’ can be grasped as an instantiation of the universal 
‘any rose whatsoever’. Often, such universals have only regional 
validity. One might notice a red rose in a field full of red roses, 
leading one to think the thought that ‘any rose whatsoever in 
this field is red’. 
Lastly, we can move from a judgment of empirical 
universality to a judgment of a priori universality. According to 
Husserl, empirical judgments still have their point of departure 
in actual experience. As long as they are not totally freed from 
actuality, they are ‘bound essences’ that have their foundation 
in the world of passive perception. For Husserl, this is what 
differentiates them from a priori universals. Their constitution 
‘does not depend on the contingency of the element actually 
given as the point of departure’ (Husserl 1997, 340; Husserl 
2002, 209-215). To attain the a priori universal, we have to 
disconnect our thoughts entirely from actual reality and 
imaginatively run through an ‘arbitrary’14 set of pure 
possibilities or possible worlds. For instance, we start not with 
the perceived rose, but with an imagined rose (a pure 
possibility) and arbitrarily vary its features in order to grasp 
what is absolutely essential to a rose in general. This act of 
judgment, according to Husserl, only concerns pure possibilities 
and makes no direct claims about actual roses. Because of this 
exclusive concern with pure possibilities, this kind of judgment 
is, as with Kant, one taking place through pure imagination 
(Husserl 1997, 370). 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
I opened this paper by referring to the conceptualism 
controversy, which is today hotly debated over in various 
subfields of philosophy. I remarked that whereas in 
contemporary debates focus lies almost exclusively on the 
question of perception’s conceptual content, both Kant and 
Husserl believe it equally important to address a second, closely 
related problem, namely how we bring perception to judgment. 
Comparing Kant’s and Husserl’s views on this second problem 
served to bring new attention to this forgotten side of the 
conceptualism controversy. 
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With respect to Kant, I first argued that for him 
perceptual experience is always already synthetically 
structured by rational capacities. This conceptualist 
background shapes his account of how perception can be 
brought to judgment. In order for judgment to be possible at all, 
Kant believes the perceptual content must already be 
determined by pure concepts before any act of schematization, 
even in the plain perception itself.  With regard to Kant’s 
analyses of judgment and schemata, I claimed that the schema 
does not serve to pre-structure perceptual experience but 
should instead be read as an imaginative (ego-)act, fleshed out 
by Kant as a ‘time-determination’, which makes judgment – a 
‘subsuming under rules’ – possible. 
In my exposition of Husserl I indicated that Husserl 
does not share Kant’s conceptualist background. It rather 
belongs to the methodological set-up of genetic phenomenology 
to analyze passive perceptual experience as pre-predicative in 
order to see from there how judgment is possible. Perception, 
for Husserl, constitutes a sui generis stratum of sense-making, 
which is not of philosophical interest merely because it can be 
judged about (as with Kant), but which deserves to be analyzed 
in its own right. 
In turning to Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological 
problem of judgment, I first discussed the notion of type, which 
Lohmar has suggested is functionally identical to the schema. 
Although I refrained from discussing Lohmar’s position in 
detail, the interpretation of the type I offered – as a form of 
passive habit which helps disclosing a field of pre-reflective 
interpretation – reveals little similarity between type and 
schema. The type is, on my reading, only indirectly related to 
problems of judgment; it is neither a concept nor a tacit 
conceptual capacity. 
In pursuit of a phenomenological clarification of 
judgment, I then turned to Husserl’s work on active synthesis. 
Here I distinguished three sorts of judgments: extraction of the 
state of affairs, judgments of empirical universality, and 
judgments of a priori universality. The first and simplest form 
of judgment consists, I argued, of an active repetition of a 
synthesis already passively pre-constituted. In extracting the 





state of affairs in this way, there need on Husserl’s account be 
no distance between mind and world: what one grasps 
rationally is the very same (actively repeated) synthetic 
accomplishment of passive perception. It is worth noting that 
this ingenious characterization of extraction as a kind of repetition 
is indebted to Husserl’s non-conceptualist approach to perception: 
it is only because perception pre-constitutes categorial structures 
from out of itself that a categorial (judgmental) act can 
subsequently be said to consist of a repetition. 
Given Kant’s predominant interest in a priori judgment 
in his discussions of the schema, a comparison to Husserl is 
incomplete without addressing the phenomenology of a priori 
judgment. On the level of judging about universals, Husserl 
fleshes out the necessary contributions of imagination. Whereas 
judging with empirical universality consists in an ego-shift 
toward the ‘one’ which ‘hides’ in the categorial objectivity, a 
priori judgment requires severing all ties with actuality, 







1 See also Van Mazijk (2015) where I offer an overview of the contemporary 
debate about non-conceptual content and distinguish between different non-
conceptualist and conceptualist stances. 
2 See especially Kant’s 1768 work Concerning the ultimate ground of the 
differentiation of directions in space (Kant 2003). Although it does not seem to 
be dealt with in the Critique, Kant does briefly refer to this debate in the 
Prolegomena. Similar points are being made in Kant’s 1786 work What does it 
mean to orient oneself in thinking? (Kant 1996). 
3 This latter position has been frequently suggested, among others by Hanna 
(2008), Allais (2009), Grüne (2009, 2011) and De Sá Pereira (2013). 
4 The contradiction can be resolved by separating the conceptually structured 
content from intuition from a necessarily non-conceptual point of orientation 
which conditions that content, but is not itself a part of that content. 
5 In spite of differences between both terms, I will use ‘subsumption’ and 
‘application’ of concepts to experience interchangeably (as does Kant). See also 
Pendlebury (1995) on this difference. 
6 Space, however, is only a necessary form (next to time) of outer intuition. 
7 Regarding empirical concepts, however, it could be argued that they coincide 
with the concept. See also Guyer (1987). 
8 See also Van Mazijk (2014a, 2016), where I discuss Barber’s (2008), 
Mooney’s (2010), and my own position. 
 




9 It should be noted that passivity and activity do not straightforwardly 
denote two separate realms of object-constitution. Husserl admits that their 
meanings are unsteady and also that passivity includes various sorts of 
activity and vice versa. In this paper, when I speak of activity, I mean the 
kind of ego-acts that involve a ‘strive for knowledge’ which is required for the 
constitution of objectivities of the understanding. When I speak of entirely 
passive formations, by contrast, I have in mind sense-formations that can be 
constituted independently of such egoic activities. 
10 On such an understanding, already hinted at by Schuetz (1959), types 
themselves would latently contain the concepts under which we may come to 
structure them syntactically. I do not think this reading is supported by 
Husserl’s work (1997, 2001). 
11 The English translation of Erfahrung und Urteil speaks of ‘eduction’. 
12 See also B. Smith’s article ‘Logic and Formal Ontology’ (1989), which, when 
held next to my reading, suggests a deep continuity between the early and 
later Husserl on this topic. 
13 See also Kern (1964) for a more elaborate discussion of the notion of a priori 
in Kant and Husserl. 
14 Although Husserl usually characterizes the process as wholly arbitrary, it 
naturally does require a model ‘which gives direction’ (Husserl 1997, 343) and 
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